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Globalisation represents a major challenge to governance. Indeed, for many the concept of globalisation 
itself is inextricably linked to the idea of ungovernability. This association is comprehensible, since the 
classic locus of governance is the state, and the debate on globalisation concerns mainly the allegedly 
declining capacity of states to regulate what happens within their territories as a result of their growing 
enmeshment in cross-border ﬂows and networks.1 
 This chapter does not address to what extent the governance capacity of states has been curtailed by 
global forces: other chapters in this volume assess the extensive literature on this question. Its aim is rather 
to review a substantial body of research which shows that the performance of governance functions is not 
limited to the actions of governments exercising sovereign powers over their jurisdictions, but occurs also 
at supranational and transnational levels. Governance – understood as the establishment and operation of 
rule systems facilitating the coordination and cooperation of social actors – is conceptually distinct from 
government – understood as an organisation in charge of administering and enforcing those rules (Young, 
1999). The literature discussed in this chapter (originating mostly from political scientists and international 
relations scholars) maintains that governance is not co-extensive with government, and that government 
should not be seen as a necessary condition of governance. More speciﬁcally, it shows that the absence of a 
world government does not mean that governance is impossible beyond the level of individual states. 
Global issues such as ozone depletion, the spread of ﬁnancial crises, and the prohibition of certain kinds of 
weapons are managed by governance structures that do not conform to the hierarchical model of rule 
setting and enforcement that is typical of states. The combination of these structures can be said to form a 
system of global governance.  
 
What is global governance? 
During the 1990s, ‘global governance’ emerged as the key term of a political programme for international 
reform2 as well as a conceptual tool in political research.3 Disparate issues have been examined through the 
lens of global governance, such as the role of business in environmental policy4 the negotiation and 
implementation of public health policies,5 peace-keeping,6 gender policies,7 weapons bans,8 the regulation 
of world trade,9 and the reform of the United Nations system.10 
 Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1995, 370–1) probably provided the most comprehensive description of what 
global governance is about: 
 
Governance should be considered to cover the overlapping categories of functions performed internationally, among 
them: information creation and exchange; formulation and promulgation of principles and promotion of consensual 
knowledge affecting the general international order, regional orders, particular issues on the international agenda, 
and efforts to inﬂuence the domestic rules and behavior of states; good ofﬁces, conciliation, mediation, and 
compulsory resolution of disputes; regime formation, tending and execution; adoption of rules, codes, and 
regulations; allocation of material and program resources; provision of technical assistance and development 
programs; relief, humanitarian, emergency, and disaster activities; and maintenance of peace and order. 
 
The complexity of this description reﬂects the problem of conceptualising governance with precision. The 
term ‘governance’ itself has been used in a variety of contexts.11 What is common to most uses of the term 
‘governance’ is that it denotes a form of social steering that does not necessarily rely on hierarchy and 
command, as the concept of government implies, but also on processes of self-organisation and horizontal 
negotiation. In systems of governance, problem solving is not the preserve of a central authority able to 
impose solutions on subordinate agencies and individuals, but the result of the interaction of a plurality of 
actors, who often have different interests, values, cognitive orientations, and power resources.12 
 
Sceptical views on global governance 
To the extent that governance implies the possibility of ‘order without hierarchy’, it is especially relevant to 
the discussions about the management of problems in the global arena, where no supreme political 
authority exists. But to conceive the international or global system as orderly does not necessarily imply the 
recognition that a form of global governance has been established. Order is not ipso facto governance. 
According to the so-called ‘realist’ tradition of international studies, the main feature of the international 
system is anarchy – that is, the absence of a world sovereign. The international system can nonetheless be 
orderly, but realists hold a restrictive view of the conditions leading to international order. Order is said to 
be possible only through two mechanisms (stressed by two different strands within the realist tradition): the 
balance of power or the hegemony by one state over the rest. In the ﬁrst case, order emerges as a by-
product of alignment decisions made by states seeking survival.13 In the second case it results from some 
degree of ‘steering’ by the most powerful actor in the system.14 In both cases, order is unstable as inter-state 
rivalry always threatens to disrupt economic relations and generate armed conﬂicts for supremacy.  
 Other components of the realists’ conception of international order contribute to their scepticism towards 
the idea that global governance exists or is a concrete possibility.15 First, this tradition is interested in 
international order, understood as inter-state order. States are considered by far the most important actors 
in world affairs. To the extent that other actors have an impact on global political and economic conditions, 
this happens within a framework constituted and governed by states.16 Second, in the realist conception of 
international order there is little room for international institutions. International institutions are either 
irrelevant or epiphenomenal, that is devoid of autonomous causal power.17 
 
Institutionalist perspectives on international governance  
To date the most elaborate response to this restrictive conception of order comes from the so-called 
‘institutionalist’ approach to international relations. Institutionalist scholars generally retain realism’s 
emphasis on the centrality of states, but deny that institutions have no real role in creating and preserving 
orderly and cooperative relations between states. On the contrary, international institutions can affect 
deeply how states behave towards each other, and enable them to cooperate in matters where otherwise 
conﬂictual relationships would have prevailed.18 
 The institutional form that has attracted more attention and study is international regimes, that is ‘sets of 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983, 2). It is the pervasive presence of regimes that 
enabled several scholars to conclude that ‘governance without government’ is a real feature of the global 
system (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). 
 While all institutionalists agree that international regimes do matter in international politics, they 
disagree on the best way to characterise their impact. This disagreement reﬂects a more general divide 
between rationalist (‘thin’) and sociological (‘thick’) institutionalism in political science.19 According to the 
former, institutional rules operate as external constraints, providing incentives and information to rational 
actors whose preferences are exogenously determined (or assumed for heuristic purposes). According to 
sociological institutionalists, on the other hand, institutions affect actors’ choices in a broader range of 
ways: by deﬁning standards of culturally and normatively appropriate behaviour and common world views, 
they structure not only external incentives but also the basic goals and identities of actors. Institutions affect 
not only what actors can do, but also what they want to do and even who they are.  
 These differences are reﬂected in the study of international regimes (Young, 1999). Rational-choice 
institutionalists in international relations theory often draw on transaction cost economics and other 
economic approaches, but the most developed theoretical framework for studying ‘cooperation under 
anarchy’ (Oye, 1996) derives from game theory. Non-cooperative game theory examines social situations 
in which rational actors cannot enter binding agreements and identiﬁes the conditions under which 
cooperation is nonetheless possible (Axelrod, 1984). These results have been applied to the study of 
international regimes, originating a ﬂow of theoretical and empirical work that shows how states – 
conceived as rational egoists – can beneﬁt from an institutionalised environment when interacting with 
each other.20 
 For sociologically minded regime theorists, on the other hand, the institutional environment in which 
states interact does not simply affect their strategies, but participates in shaping their identity and goals.21 
Cooperation under anarchy is possible because states’ actions are not oriented only to ‘logics of 
consequences’ (rational behaviour designed to maximise exogenous utility) but also to ‘logics of 
appropriateness’ (rules, roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behaviour in given situations).22 
Norms have an independent causal impact on the behaviour of actors, which have been socialised through 
domestic and international learning processes. The recent wave of constructivist theorising presents in a 
different form some of the insights of the English school, which depicted the international system as an 
‘anarchical society’ (Bull, 1977) where order is assured by a mix of power politics and common values. 
Insights from constructivism and English school theory have been recently been synthesized in a theory of 
the social structure of globalization (Buzan 2004)  
 The effects of international institutions in general and of regimes and organisations in particular on the 
behaviour of states are summarised in Table 18.1. 
 
From international regimes to global governance 
Regime theory has produced an impressive amount of theoretical and empirical knowledge on various 
aspects of international affairs. This body of knowledge is an indispensable foundation for the study of 
global governance. Conventional regime theory, however, tends to ignore the contribution of non-state 
actors to the management of cross-border issues. The concept of governance, on the contrary, is frequently 
used to convey the idea that public actors have no monopoly over the resolution of public problems and 
that they increasingly collaborate with other actors in various stages of the policy-making process (Koenig-
Archibugi, 2002). This section provides an overview of the literature on the contribution of non-state actors 
to global governance, and focuses on three types of non-state actors: not-for-proﬁt non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), business entities, and the staff of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). 
 Over the last decade there has been a proliferation of studies on NGO participation in global public 
policy, which have examined several issue areas: human rights,23 rules of war,24 humanitarian 
emergencies,25 gender issues,26 economic development,27 demography,28 health policy,29 business 
regulation,30 and environmental protection.31 Several studies provide comparisons across issue areas or 
general reﬂections on public–private cooperation.32 
 
Table 18.1 Functions of international institutions and organisations according to institutionalist 
approaches to world politics 
 
 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND  
 ORGANISATIONS: 
Rationalist institutionalism provide information about common problems 
            provide information about preferences 
 facilitate the signalling of intentions 
 constrain bargaining strategies 
 provide focal points in negotiations 
 facilitate tactical issue linkage 
 increase the credibility of promises 
 multiply interactions 
 disseminate information about past behaviour 
 deﬁne obligations and cheating 
 deﬁne appropriate sanctions for non-compliance 
 improve the monitoring of compliance 
 coordinate decentralised sanctioning 
 ……………………………………… 
 deﬁne standard operating procedures 
 stabilise routines 
 generate cognitive models 
 deﬁne rules of appropriate behaviour  
            consolidate normative world views 
Sociological institutionalism shape the formation of identities 
 
 
 According to Thomas Risse (2001), it is no longer disputed that NGOs and other ‘not for proﬁt’ 
transnational actors make a difference in world politics: now the interesting question is why, and under 
what conditions. Some go as far as claiming that, in the steering of global affairs, states have been joined 
by other actors that are ‘equally important’ (Rosenau, 2000, 187).  
 The available evidence does not support the ‘equal importance’ thesis: global public policy making is 
characterised by conspicuous asymmetries in power and tasks, and the current balance of power (still) 
favours states. Having said that, it seems indeed indisputable that NGOs are nearly ubiquitous, having 
established their presence in virtually all international policy domains. They are well entrenched in 
traditional areas such as development policy, humanitarian assistance and environmental protection, but 
their presence is increasing also on previously less accessible issues like ﬁnance (debt cancellation) and 
arms control (land mines). Wolfgang Reinicke and his associates (2000) showed that a number of important 
global problems are dealt with by tripartite networks, bringing together public agencies, business actors and 
advocacy groups on an informal basis. It has even been argued that ‘human rights NGOs are the engine for 
virtually every advance made by the United Nations in the ﬁeld of human rights since its founding’ (Gaer, 
1996, 51).  
 On the other hand, presence is not necessarily inﬂuence. For instance, the authors of a comprehensive 
study of the relationship between three global social movements (environmental, labour and women’s 
movements) and three multilateral economic institutions (the IMF, World Bank and WTO) conclude that 
some change in the way the institutions make policy has occurred as a result of this relationship, but they 
add: ‘While signalling an alteration to the method of governance, it is less clear that there is a change either 
in the content of governing policies or in the broad interests they represent’ (O’Brien et al., 2000, 206). 
Another study, comparing NGO ‘participation’ in the UN World Conferences on the environment, human 
rights and women held during the 1990s, shows that NGOs were granted high visibility and access to many 
ofﬁcial fora, but there is little evidence that the states accepted the NGOs’ perspective on the problems 
debated. Considering moreover that access itself was conditional, the authors conclude: ‘state sovereignty 
set the limits of global civil society’ (Clark et al., 1998, 35). In sum, the existing empirical literature on the 
contribution of NGOs to global governance does not seem to allow general conclusions yet.  
 With regard to the role of the business actors in the management of cross-border activities and 
exchanges, several recent studies demonstrate that this is signiﬁcant. Some sceptics hold that ‘International 
ﬁrms create the need for improved international governance, but they do not and cannot provide it’ (Grant, 
1997, 319), but other researchers have shown that, in many areas, business actors have established 
transnational regimes that give order and predictability to the massive ﬂow of transactions that takes place 
across state borders. A major study on global business regulation ﬁnds that in all the sectors considered 
‘state regulation follows industry self-regulatory practice more than the reverse, though the reverse is also 
very important’ (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, 481). Other researchers have highlighted several regimes 
whose members are mainly or exclusively private actors.33 These transnational regimes overlap with and 
sometimes are functional equivalents of the international regimes established by governments. In addition, 
business actors – that is interest associations or powerful corporations – participate regularly in the 
international policy-making process, and in many cases have a decisive inﬂuence on the outcomes.34 
 Conventional regime analysis tends to neglect not only non-state actors such as NGOs and companies, 
but also international organisations as organisations. Most institutionalist analyses focus on the operation 
and effectiveness of regimes, which are not actors in their own right and affect outcomes only by 
inﬂuencing the behaviour of members and others subject to their provisions. In comparison, less attention 
has been paid to intergovernmental organisations, which often are at the centre of a regime and which in 
principle are capable of agency. 
 Research on IGOs as autonomous policy-making actors has been quite scarce.35 However, in the past few 
years a number of studies have advanced interesting hypotheses about the goals, functions and power of 
IGOs, which can provide a theoretical foundation for further empirical research.36 Case studies of 
multilateral negotiations have already highlighted the active role of the bureaucrats who staff international 
organisations, showing that they are able to exercise inﬂuence by forging strategic alliances, sponsoring 
research, mobilising technical expertise, raising public awareness, and playing a leadership role in 
negotiations.37 This involves a certain degree of operational autonomy, that is the ofﬁcials’ capacity to act 
independently of their ‘principals’ – namely, the governments that have collectively delegated functions to 
them. 
 In sum, the management of global affairs is not the preserve of governments, but involves a broad range 
of actors, at the domestic and transnational levels. Speciﬁcally, global governance implies that ﬁrms and 
NGOs are not simply the passive recipients of the rules negotiated by governments above their heads, but 
participate in various ways in the formulation of those rules through public–private partnerships, or even by 
establishing purely private regimes to regulate certain domains in their common interest. Therefore, actor 
pluralism should be added to the possibility of non-hierarchical order and the role of institutions as a 
deﬁning characteristic of global governance. 
 
Normative perspectives on global governance 
This chapter had focused on analytical and empirical work on global governance, but normative approaches 
to the problem deserve at least a brief mention. The legitimacy of global governance can be assessed from a 
variety of perspectives, most of which are based on the commitment to democracy as an essential condition 
for the legitimisation of political orders.38 Roughly two main positions can be distinguished: democratic 
inter-governmentalism and democratic cosmopolitanism. 
 According to democratic inter-governmentalism, global governance cannot receive direct democratic 
legitimisation, but must obtain its legitimacy indirectly through the participation of democratically elected 
governments in global policy making.39 In this view, democracy requires a public sphere, and no 
transnational public sphere exists now or is in sight. There are at least two formidable obstacles to the 
formation of a public sphere beyond the nation state, one cognitive and one affective. On the one hand, 
democratic deliberation is impossible when de facto the majority of people is excluded from global 
networks of political communication, notably because of insufﬁcient foreign language skills. Deliberation 
in supranational fora would be monopolised by educated elites and therefore remain undemocratic. On the 
other hand, the acceptance of the results of collective and possibly majoritarian decisions requires a degree 
of solidarity and sense of common belonging that is extremely weak beyond the national level. 
 According to democratic cosmopolitanism, democratic legitimacy can and should be conferred through 
multiple channels, in a pattern that corresponds to the pluralistic character of global governance. Moreover, 
the democratisation of international institutions itself can extend the focus of concern and loyalty of 
individuals and groups beyond the national dimension, and for this reason democratic restructuring should 
be conceived as a dialectical process of mutual reinforcement. Cosmopolitan institutions (such as a global 
assembly of peoples and forceful international tribunals) will enhance the effectiveness of global public 
policy making by increasing its legitimacy and at the same time they will promote domestic democracy.40 
 Debating the normative strengths and benefits of different models of global governance is important 
because, while the establishment of a genuinely democratic system of global governance may be unlikely 
in the near future, there is little reason to believe that it is impossible. 41 
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